Tracked vulnerabilities

tiger-gh-mcp-server started its MCP HTTP transport without enabling the host allow-list the underlying SDK provides. src/httpServer.ts called the shared httpServerFactory helper and never set the DNS-rebinding-protection option, so the transport accepted a request whatever host it named, making the locally reachable GitHub MCP endpoint drivable from a page in a visitor's browser that pointed a name it controlled at the bound address. The fix passes the option explicitly alongside a dependency update; the update alone would not have closed it. The repository has published no release that brackets the fix, so the affected boundary is the commit preceding it.

tiger-slack started its MCP HTTP transport without enabling the host allow-list the underlying SDK provides. mcp/src/httpServer.ts called the shared httpServerFactory helper and never set the DNS-rebinding-protection option, so the transport accepted a request whatever host it named, and a page in a browser could point a name it controlled at the address the server was bound to and drive the locally reachable Slack MCP server through the visitor's browser. The fix passes the option explicitly alongside a dependency update; the update alone would not have closed it. The repository publishes no release that brackets the fix, so the affected boundary is the commit preceding it.

The Telnyx MCP server exposed its HTTP transport on every interface and did not require a caller credential. packages/mcp-server/src/http.ts served MCP on the root path with a listener bound to all interfaces and parsed the caller's authentication headers in a mode that did not fail when they were absent, so a request without any credential completed initialisation and dispatched tools. Dispatch forwarded the server's own stored credentials, the Telnyx API key and client secret together with the code-execution key, to the upstream endpoint, so an unauthenticated caller able to reach the port acted with them. The current code defaults the host to loopback, requires a server API key, and enforces it in middleware.

The execute_ruby tool is documented as a read-only Ruby sandbox and is enforced by a pattern denylist together with replacements for the process-spawning methods on Kernel. The pseudo-terminal library's spawn entry points are neither in the denylist nor replaced, so a normal tool call could reach them and start a shell, executing commands as the account running the server and outside the guarded methods. The denylist was introduced with the tool in 1.4.0 and never covered those entry points through 1.6.0. Version 1.6.1 restricts the requires the sandbox permits to a data-only list and blocks dynamic dispatch to execution entry points; 2.0.0 removes the tool.

ToolUniverse ran caller-supplied Python inside a sandbox that could be escaped, on a server that required no authentication. The executor behind the python_code_executor tool, in python_executor_tool.py, inspected the submitted source for a denied list of attribute names and calls but left the attribute-lookup builtins available and did not stop a dunder attribute reached through a string lookup or through a module already permitted, so a caller could walk from a literal's class to its base and enumerate subclasses to obtain a reference to the process and subprocess modules. A per-call argument also let the caller widen the import allow-list before the inspection ran. The HTTP and MCP servers in http_api_server.py and smcp_server.py bound to every interface with debugging enabled and no authentication, so any caller able to reach the port executed code as the server process. Version 1.3.0 adds bearer-token authentication, defaults the bind address to loopback, and hardens the attribute checks.

pg-aiguide started its MCP HTTP transport without enabling the host allow-list the underlying SDK provides. src/httpServer.ts called the shared httpServerFactory helper and never set the DNS-rebinding-protection option, so the transport accepted a request whatever host it named. A page in a browser could therefore point a name it controlled at the address the server was bound to and drive the locally reachable MCP server through the visitor's browser. The protection was already available in the packaged transport and simply not turned on, so updating the dependency alone would not have closed it. Version 0.5.1 passes the option explicitly.

The mcp-router CLI served its MCP aggregator on every interface and enforced authentication only when the operator asked for it. The serve command in apps/cli/src/commands/serve.ts defaulted its host to the all-interfaces address on a fixed port, and required a token only when the corresponding flag was supplied, so a default invocation exposed the aggregator, and every MCP server it fronted, to anyone able to reach the port. Release 0.6.3 defaults the host to the loopback address and refuses to start without a token whenever the host it is given is not a loopback address; no earlier release carries either check.

The get-html-skeleton tool fetched a URL the caller supplied after checking only its syntax. The handler in src/tools/common/get_html_skeleton.ts validated the url argument with isValidHttpUrl from src/utils/generic.ts, which confirmed the string began with an http or https scheme and parsed as a URL and inspected neither the host name nor the address it resolves to. Loopback, link-local and private ranges therefore passed, including the address cloud providers use to serve instance metadata. The unchecked URL was handed to the web-browser actor and the fetched document was returned in the tool response, so any caller of the MCP server could make it request an endpoint reachable only from the host and read the result, including instance credentials. Version 0.9.12 removes the tool.

mcp-go accepted requests on its HTTP transports without checking the Host header. StreamableHTTPServer.ServeHTTP in server/streamable_http.go and SSEServer.ServeHTTP in server/sse.go served any request arriving over a loopback connection regardless of the host it named, and the SSE transport's cross-origin default allowed any origin. A page in a browser could therefore point a name it controlled at the loopback address and reach a server listening there, invoking tools and reading resources that the server exposed on the assumption that only local software could connect. No release before 0.56.0 validated the header on either transport; 0.56.0 adds server/http_localhost.go, which rejects a loopback-bound request carrying a host that is not a loopback name, and wires it into both transports.

The proxy middleware in mcp-use's inspector forwards requests to a destination the caller names. mountMcpProxy in libraries/typescript/packages/inspector/src/server/proxy/mcp-proxy.ts read the target from the X-Target-URL header or the __mcp_target parameter and proxied to it without inspecting the host, so loopback, link-local and private addresses were all accepted, as were names that resolve to them, and the validation was not reapplied to a redirect the destination returned. A caller could therefore make the server issue requests to addresses reachable only from the host it runs on and read the responses. The current code calls isSafeProxyTarget, which checks the resolved address against private, loopback and link-local ranges before proxying and bounds the number of redirects followed.

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::MessageEncoder wrote a DNS label's length into a single octet without checking its range. A label longer than 255 octets had its length stored modulo 256 but the label data was written unchanged, and thus the bytes on the wire described a different name than the one the application asked to encode. RFC 1035 section 2.3.4 limits a label to 63 octets, and the two high bits of the length octet are reserved for compression pointers. put_string packed the length with put_pack("C", d.length) and put_label used it for labels, and thus any value from 0 to 255 could end up as a label length octet, including the reserved 0x40-0xBF range and the 0xC0-0xFF pointer range. Resolv::DNS::Name.create did not check per-label or total name length either, and thus an attacker-controlled hostname reached the encoder unchanged. An application that resolves an attacker-controlled hostname sends a query whose wire bytes name a domain the attacker chose. A hostname suffix that the application validates against an allowlist becomes padding that never appears on the wire, and thus allowlist and egress checks can be bypassed. The recursive resolver caches the response under the attacker's name, and DNS logs record that name rather than the one the application asked for. A label length whose low octet lands in the 0xC0-0xFF range produces a length octet that conforming parsers read as the start of a compression pointer, with the following attacker-controlled byte as the offset.

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.